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A Century of Bank Rate by Ralph G. Hawtrey

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Das Buch wurde von seinem inzwischen fast völlig unbekannten Autor Ralph George Hawtrey im Jahr 1962 veröffentlicht.

Sich mit der Geschichte der Wirtschaft zu befassen, verschafft einem ganz ungewohnte Einblicke und Erkenntnisse. So zum Beispiel zur geradezu selbstverständlichen Verursachung der Großen Depression durch die Geldpolitik der Notenbanken auf der Grundlage eines Goldstandards.

Daher ist die Wirtschaftsgeschichte kein Thema an den Universitäten. Statt Wirtschaftsgeschichte wird Modellbau und Dogmenkunde betrieben.

Warum das so ist, lässt sich an den Büchern von Hawtrey studieren, der nicht ohne Grund vergessen gemacht wurde. Ohne Google-Books heute wäre Hawtrey wohl ganz vergessen, denn wer sucht schon in Archiven nach den Büchern von Autoren, von denen kein Mensch mehr redet?

Als Beispiel bringe ich nachfolgend einen Auszug aus dem Buch von Hawtrey, auf dessen Höhepunkt der damalige Chef der Bank von England, Montagu Norman, von John Maynard Keynes zu den Auswirkungen seiner Geldpolitik auf die konjunkturelle Depression befragt wird.

Es soll niemand mehr behaupten, die hätten damals nicht alles schon gewusst:

The Cunliffe and Macmillan Committees


The Committee appointed in 1918, under the chairmanship of Lord Cunliffe, upon Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War, was faithful to the Bank rate tradition. “Whenever before the war the Bank´s reserves were being depleted,” said the interim Report (par. 18), “the rate of discount was raised. This … by reacting upon the rates for money generally, acted as a check which operated in two ways. On the one hand, raised money rates tended directly to attract gold to this country or to keep gold here that might have left. On the other hand, by lessening demands for loans for business purposes , they tended directly to attract gold to this country, with the result that imports were discouraged and exports encouraged, and the exchanges thereby turned in our favour.” This was a very fair summary of the views of the Fathers and Prophets of a hundred years ago. In an earlier passage the Report pointed out how precarious was the relief given to the foreign exchange position by the attraction of foreign money. “It would have resulted in the creation of a volume of short-dated indebtedness to foreign countroes which would have been in the end disastrous to our credit” (par. 5). Thus all the weight was attached to the other effect of a high Bank rate – deflation. But very little stress was laid upon “the consequent slackening of employment.”

The Committee on Finance and Industry, presided over by Lord Macmillan, which was appointed in 1929 and reported in 1931, was much more pre-occupied with this last aspect of the matter. They failed, however, to extract any definite admission of the tendency of a high Bank rate to cause unemployment from the representatives of the Bank of England.

The examination of the Governor, Mr. Montagu Norman, on the subject of Bank rate was started with the following questions and answers:

“If that instrument [Bank rate] is used for the purpose of preserving the stock of gold, is it effective for that purpose?” - “It is effective.”

“How far is the instrument with which you are equipped effective for the purpose?” - “It is effective.”

“For that purpose?” - “It is effective in my opinion.”
(Questions 3324-6.)

No doubt, it was well to make sure.

Questioned next in regard to the effect of Bank rate on the internal business of the country as distinguished from the external or foreign exchange position, Mr. Norman said: “I should think its internal effects were greatly exaggerated – that its actual ill effects were greatly exaggerated and that they are much more psychological than real.” (Question 3328.)

“But even if it has psychological consequences, they may be depressing consequences and may be serious?” - “Yes, but not so serious as they are usually made out to be.”

“… I think that the disadvantages to the internal position are relatively small compared with the advantages to the external position.” (Question 3331-2.)

Asked whether financial policy had not something to do with the phenomenal fall in price levels that had occurred, Mr. Norman replied: “I believe practically nothing, in so far as the most recent and heavy falls are concerned.”

Mr. Keynes, who was a member of the Committee, put a series of detailed questions leading up to an exposition of the traditional doctrine of the working of Bank rate: “The method of its operation on the internal situation is that the higher Bank rate would mean curtailment of credit, that the curtailment of credit would diminish enterprise and cause unemployment, and that that unemployment would tend to bring down wages and cost of production generally. … The virtue of Bank rate is that, while it would have a quick effect on the international situation, it would also have a slow and perhaps more important effect on the internal position, by setting up tendencies to bring about a new level of money costs of production so as to enable us to have more nearly that level of exports which the international situation requires us. If the effect of the Bank rate on the internal situation were of a negligible character, all that would not happen. Am I right,” he ended, “in thinking that you would agree with that, what I call, perhaps wrongly, orthodox theory of Bank rate?” Mr. Norman responded with a grudging and unconvinced assent: “I should imagine, that, as you have stated it, that is the orthodox theory, taking a long view, and as such I should subscribe to it – I could not dispute it with you.”

“If that is so,” Mr. Keynes went on, “half the point of Bank rate is that it should have an effect on the internal situation?”
“Well,” was the reply, “I do not think so necessarily apart from the short money position.” (Question 3390-1.)

Presently Lord Macmillan intervened (Question 3431-3): “when the international position requires, in your view, a raising of the Bank rate, that in turn is made effective by restriction of credit, is it not?” - “May be.”

“And may it not therefore have … a consequent deterrent effect on enterprise in this country? In your view, I take it, that is inevitable and possibly salutary?” - “I think it may be inevitable.”

“And again, speaking in the broadest terms, is it your view that the consequences of that internal restriction of credit, unfortunate as they may appear to be, are outweighed by the advantages of the maintenance of the international position?” - “Yes, there is very large benefit.”

There were two points which were not adequately brought out in this examination: first, that the depressing effect of a high Bank rate on industry is not merely incidental to the process of making the foreign exchanges favourable, but is the very substance and foundation of that process; secondly, that the depressing effect is not dependent on the “restriction of credit”, but is wrought by the high charges for advances of all kinds, loans, overdrafts and bills, throughout the credit system. The restriction of credit, in the special sense of a reduction by the Bank of England of its holdings of bills and securities, was merely a device for making Bank rate effective in the discount market.

A Century of Bank Rate von R. G. Hawtrey

Pages 232-235

Einfach mit Google-Books suchen!

Bei einem Studium der Wirtschaftsgeschichte zeigt sich, dass die ganzen absurden Diskussionen über das Saysche Theorem oder die Theorie vom Allgemeinen Gleichgewicht der Märkte allein der Irreführung der Öffentlichkeit dienen und dass ein Studium der VWL allein dem Zweck der Indoktrination dient.
 

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